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ABSTRACT
Content-Based Image Retrieval Systems (CBIRS) used in
forensics related contexts require very good image recogni-
tion capabilities. Whereas the robustness criterion has been
extensively covered by Computer Vision or Multimedia lit-
erature, none of these communities explored the security of
CBIR systems. Recently, preliminary studies have shown
real systems can be deluded by applying transformations to
images that are very specific to the SIFT local description
scheme commonly used for recognition. The work presented
in this paper adds one strategy for attacking images, and
somehow enlarges the box of tools hackers can use for de-
luding systems. This paper shows how the orientation of
keypoints can be tweaked, which in turn lowers matches
since this deeply changes the final SIFT feature vectors. The
method learns what visual patch should be applied to change
the orientation of keypoints thanks to an SVM-based process.
Experiments with a database made of 100,000 real world
images confirms the effectiveness of this keypoint-orientation
attacking scheme.
Index Terms— SIFT, SVM, Forensics, Security
1. INTRODUCTION
CBIRS get increasingly involved in multimedia forensics
applications such as the detection of illegal copies of copy-
righted material, or the automatic detection of child pornog-
raphy images. Since the goal is here to scout fraudulent
behaviors, the system is likely facing some malevolent forces
which will adapt and strike back. Whereas the community
usually benchmarks the robustness of CBIRS against generic
content transformations (compressions, crops, . . . ), their se-
curity has rarely been addressed. The security of a CBIRS
is its ability to resist to some dedicated attacks led by mali-
cious pirates against the specific techniques this system uses.
Recently, a handful of papers have warned the community
about the poor security levels of CBIRS [2, 1, 3]. These
papers describe various strategies endangering the recogni-
tion capabilities of systems relying on the well-known SIFT
descriptors [5]. Once accurately known the way SIFT works,
it is possible to transform images introducing as few visual
distortions as possible, while maximizing the impact on the
final descriptors used for matching. In turn, the system might
fail to recognize an image otherwise always detected, or rank
it far in the list of images found to be similar.
Our paper [1] uses a complex mixtures of keypoint re-
moval and keypoint creation. Removing keypoints reduces
the number of matches; creating keypoints produces false
positives. Overall, [1] exploits the way the Difference of
Gaussian (DoG) value of a keypoint is used in the SIFT
extraction process. [1] applies on images carefully crafted
visual patches around keypoints to preclude or trigger their
detection at feature extraction time.
The work presented in this paper follows a different track.
It exploits the way the orientation of keypoints is used in the
SIFT extraction process. In Section 2, we review SIFT and
then study the influence of the orientation of keypoints on
the matching of descriptors. Numerical experiments show
that if a sufficient change in orientation of a keypoint is in-
troduced, then the resulting descriptor computed from the at-
tacked keypoint is more difficult to match with the original
descriptor. Section 3 proposes a method based on multiple
SVMs for learning the best orientation changing patches to be
applied on keypoints. Section 4 evaluates the effectiveness of
this method against a database of 100,000 images and shows
this orientation-based strategy for attacking images described
with SIFT can delude systems.
2. SIFT: FROM ORIENTATION TO DESCRIPTOR
2.1. Overview of SIFT
SIFT computes local features by running a three steps pro-
cess. First, it detects a keypoint located in (x, y) in the image
at scale σ if it is a local extremum of the DoG response. In the
second step, the main orientation θ is computed based on gra-
dient directions locally around (x, y). The keypoint is defined
as kp = {x, y, σ, θ}. The third step computes a descriptor on
a support region centered on (x, y), whose size depends on
scale σ. A support region is divided into 16 subregions, and a
8-bin quantized histogram of weighted gradient orientation is
computed on each subregion, resulting in a 128-dimensional
descriptor. It is key to note that gradient orientations are de-
Fig. 1. Euclidean distance between descriptors as a function
of the distance in radian between the keypoint orientation.
termined relatively to the keypoint orientation θ, achieving
invariance to rotation.
2.2. Changing Orientations Impacts Descriptors
As the value of the descriptor is relative to the keypoint orien-
tation, modifying that orientation will thus change the decrip-
tor. Note that this is different from rotating the whole support
region, which has no impact on description.
Figure 1 shows the impact of a forced change of orien-
tation for all the keypoints from octaves {−1, 0, 1} of the
Lena image. We first described Lena using the open-source
VLFeat package [6]. We then patched the code of VLFeat to
artificially change the orientation of the keypoints it detects
by a multiple of pi/18. We then launched 35 descriptions of
Lena, each time increasing the orientation change from pi/18
to 35pi/18. The Figure 1 plots the distance in the feature
space between the descriptors computed on Lena and the de-
scriptors after the orientation changes. Only the distances for
changes between pi/18 and pi are reported in this figure as it
is symetric beyond that point. Figure 1 shows that the larger
distances in feature space are reached when keypoint orienta-
tion is changed by pi/2 (hence also 3pi/2). In other words, if
the new orientation is orthogonal to the original one, then the
maximum difference between descriptors is obtained. This
applies to other images as well.
3. SVM FOR CHANGING ORIENTATIONS
This section describes the method we use to force the orien-
tation of keypoints. In short, we learn what patch  should be
applied to a specific support region to change the orientation
by pi/2. This method relies on a collection of SVMs. Each
SVM determines the hyperplane separating the keypoints
having the orientation θ1 from the keypoints having the ori-
entation θ2 = θ1 + pi/2. To facilitate learning, reduce the
noise and be more effective, the orientation space is quantized
in bins of length pi/18. Therefore, we use 18 SVM classifiers
trained for the 18 pairs of orthogonal orientations (e.g., from
orientations ranging in [0, pi/18] to orthogonal orientations
ranging in pi/2 + [0, pi/18]).
To train the SVMs, we first determine all the keypoints
and their orientation (using VLFeat) for a set of 1,000 images
randomly picked from Flickr. We keep only keypoints be-
longing to the octaves {−1, 0, 1} as their support regions are
quite small, facilitating patching them visually while not too
severely distorting the images. We then normalize all support
regions to be of size (12×12) (this is the average size of low-
est octave patches observed on a large set of images) and map
all of them from grayscale to range [0, 1]. It is then stored in
a vector r of L components.
The set of keypoints is then divided into classes according
to their orientations θ. Let X1 = {(ri, `i)}i be the training set
of normalized support regions ri of a given orientation θ1,
forming the class labelled by `i = +1. X2 = {(rj , `j)}j is
the training set of normalized support regions rj whose ori-
entation is θ2 = θ1 + pi/2, forming the dual class labelled by
`j = −1. At training time, the SVM in charge of θ1 and θ2
learns the hyperplan parameters (w, b) separating X1 and X2
as solution of:
`k.(〈w,Φ(rk)〉+ b) ≥ 1 ∀rk ∈ {X1,X2},
with 〈w,Φ(x)〉 = ∑k:αk>0 αk`kK(x, rk),
where Φ maps x to an higher dimensional space, αk are the
Lagrange multipliers, and K is the Radial Basis kernel func-
tion (RBF):
K(x, rk) = 〈Φ(x),Φ(rk)〉 = exp
(
−‖x− rk‖
2
2σ2
)
. (1)
Once trained, the SVM is used to determine the patch 
of minimum norm to be added to a region r ∈ X1, such that
r +  ∈ X2. This asks to solve the following optimization:
min
1
2
‖‖2 (2)
s.t.
∑
k:αk>0
αk`kK(r + , rk) + b = `2∆d, (3)
and 0 ≤ ri + i ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L} (4)
where ∆d > 0 is the distance from r +  to the hyperplane
(w, d). Eq. (4) ensures that the modified region remains in the
range [0, 1]. Define scalars ak = αk`kK(r, rk), and vectors
ck = 2(r− rk). Then, Eq. (3) can be rewritten as:∑
k:αk>0
ak exp
(
−c
>
k  + ‖‖2
2σ2
)
= `2∆d− b. (5)
This minimization problem under constraints is solved us-
ing an interior-point method, resulting in the desired  to be
applied. Once  is known for a particular r, we reshape to
12 × 12, interpolate to fit the corresponding support region,
and rescale it, to finally add this patch to the pixels.
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Fig. 2. Number of keypoints per orientation change bin after
support region modification.
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Fig. 3. Distance between the original and modified descrip-
tors per orientation change bin.
4. EVALUATION
In this section, we first evaluate the effectiveness of the above
method for changing the orientation of keypoints. We show
that while the orientation of many keypoints indeed change,
some remain un-impacted. We evaluate the method at the im-
age level and show new keypoints appear as side effects of
visual distortions. We finally benchmark the effectiveness of
the method when querying a database of 100,000 random im-
ages with orientation-attacked quasi-copies.
The 100,000 images used have been randomly down-
loaded from Flickr and are very diverse in contents. All
images have been resized to 512 pixels on their longer edge.
This collection yields 103,454,566 SIFT-VLFeat descriptors.
The SVMs were trained using 1,000 random images from
that set, as described earlier. Note that this amounts to about
1,026,000 samples, and the number of samples per orienta-
tion class ranges between 19,567 and 45,060. Note also that
we set ∆d = 2 in our experiments.
4.1. Ability to Change Orientations
We applied the method to the keypoints of the 1,000 images.
To check whether or not orientations changed, we observed
for all keypoints the angle between each original and attacked
keypoint, expecting a change of ∆θ = pi/2. However, this is
not always verified. Figure 2 counts the number of keypoints
as a function of the observed orientation change ∆θ. Each
bin on x-axis covers a range of pi/18 from 0 to pi: the first bin
corresponds to keypoints with ∆θ ∈ [0, pi/18[, . . . It appears
that for most of the keypoints, the orientation is changing by
6pi/18 to 8pi/18 (7th and 8th bins). The value of ∆d drives
this phenomenon: a larger value for ∆d increases the number
of pi/2 changes but in turn causes more severe and visible
distortions in the patches.
While Figure 1 suggested enforcing ∆θ = pi/2 would be
best, Figure 3 shows that, in practice, a value for ∆θ rang-
ing from 4pi/18 to 13pi/18 pushes far away the attacked de-
scriptors in the feature space. Figure 3 shows the average of
the euclidean distances between the original and attacked de-
scriptors, as a function of ∆θ. The observed distances are
fairly constant between 4pi/18 and 13pi/18. It is therefore not
necessary to increase ∆d. When ∆d = 2 and when combin-
ing Fig. 2 and 3, then about 79% of the orientations changed,
moving as far as possible descriptors in the feature space, and
making matches potentially problematic.
The average PSNR between the original and attacked
patches is 21.64dB. It is possible to preserve the PSNR by
running a small variant of the method. Instead of applying
the patch to the whole support region, only it central region
is added. The size of the latter is proportional to the size of
the support region, e.g. 11 × 11 for scale σ = 0. It is how-
ever quite effective due to the weighting scheme used when
determining the orientation, the central area of the support
regions having more influence. Reproducing all experiments
with this variant gives an average PSNR of 23.84dB. It does,
however, change the effectiveness of the method as fewer
keypoints have their orientation changed–modifying the cen-
tral part of their support region being not sufficient. Figure 4
counts the number of keypoint as a function of ∆θ observed
with this variant. It clearly shows many orientations could not
be changed (see the left-most bin); most of the keypoints that
changed orientation have a ∆θ ∈ [4pi/18, 10pi/18]. The dis-
tances between descriptors are identical to the ones observed
on Fig. 3. Because it gives good results while preserving the
PSNR, this variant is the method used in the sequel.
4.2. Impact at Image-Level
To get an acceptable visual distortion for the attacked image,
the variant modifying the center of support regions is used and
applied only if the PSNR between the original and patched
support regions is bigger than a given threshold tPSNR. We
apply the method to 1,000 images for 3 different tPSNR val-
ues: 15.3, 16.3, and 17dB. The average PSNR computed
over the 1,000 images are respectively 28.39, 29.24, and
29.93dB, showing the PSNR increases with tPSNR.
Having a closer look on how the keypoints are modified
by the orientation attack shows that keypoints can be divided
into three classes: (i) either the keypoint is unchanged (same
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Fig. 4. Number of keypoints per orientation change bin when
applying a centered cropped patch.
location, same scale, same orientation), or (ii) its orientation
has changed (same location, same scale, but significantly dif-
ferent orientation), or (iii) a new keypoint is has been created
as side effect of distortions introduced by the attack.
We evaluate how many keypoints fall into each class as
follows. Let kpo = {xo, yo, σo, θo} be an original keypoint,
(x, y, σ, θ) a keypoint in attacked image, and d(.,.) the eu-
clidean distance. A keypoint falls into the class (i) if there is a
kpo such that d ((x, y), (xo, yo)) ≤ 5 and 0.7 ≤ σ/σo ≤ 1.3
and |θ − θo| ≤ pi/18. These values have been determined
because any keypoint in that class remains pretty close to its
original keypoint in the feature space (at a distance lower than
200, see Fig. 3), allowing easy matching. A keypoint falls into
the class (ii) if there is a kpo such that d ((x, y), (xo, yo)) ≤ 5
and 0.7 ≤ σ/σo ≤ 1.3 and |θ − θo| ≥ pi/18. The remaining
keypoints fall into the class (iii). They can be seen as new
keypoints as they are far in position or scale with respect to
the original keypoints. Overall, when applying the method to
1,000 images with tPSNR = 17, then about 58% of the key-
points have their orientation changed (they fall into class (ii)),
28% fall into class (i) and 27% fall into class (iii).
4.3. Impact on Large-Scale Recognition
To run an experiment involving large-scale recognition, we
indexed the 103,454,566 SIFT-VLFeat descriptors with the
NV-Tree high-dimensional indexing scheme [4]. The NV-
Tree runs approximate k-NN queries and has been specifi-
cally designed to index large collections of local descriptors.
The same 1,000 images are used as queries and we ran the
proposed orientation attack on them resulting in quasi-copies.
The variant modifying the center of support regions is used
and controlled by the tPSNR threshold. Each query probes
the system which returns the top 100 images with associated
scores. We then compute the average score of the original
image (the one used to forge the quasi-copy that the sys-
tem should identify). Figure 5 shows average score of orig-
inal image (red line) and the four top matching images for
some different tPSNR values. From right to left, the gap be-
tween original image and best competitor scores decreases, as
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
15.2 15.4 15.6 15.8 16 16.2 16.4 16.6 16.8 17
orig
best comp
2nd best
3rd best
4th best
Fig. 5. Average scores over 1,000 queries for tPSNR equals
15.3, 16.3, or 17.
the strength of the attack increases. The attack succeeds for
tPSNR = 15.3. Even if the attacked image is not completely
concealed, the original image has not the best score anymore,
and gets hidden behind another image that better matches.
5. CONCLUSIONS
A new angle of attack of CBIRS based on SIFT descrip-
tors, focusing on the influence of the orientation disturbance
on the recognition of an image, is studied. The orientation
shift in descriptor computation is accomplished by introduc-
ing locally non-affine modifications, through the addition of
patches that are learned by an SVMs process. The effective-
ness of the method is evaluated on a substantial number of
images. The results show that applying this single attack can
lower enough the score of the original image so that it is no
longer returned at first position by the system. Clearly, to be
truly effective, this strategy must be combined with other at-
tacks. In future work, the geometric verification step included
in CBIR as post-filtering should be considered also.
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